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I.

INTRODUCTION

Proponents advocating the theory of founding moments in
American constitutional development advocate, “[T]he real
Constitution is a set of principles adopted by ‘We, the People’ at
extraordinary ‘moments’ of intense constitutional participation and
deliberation, with or without changes in the constitutional text.” 1
Although a compelling position, I would propose a contrary one:
there are no real founding moments; rather any “constitutional”
* Professor Spiess is currently in private practice focusing on the areas of
employment, trust and estates, tax, and commercial matters. She is also an
adjunct professor at Touro Law Center. She is formerly the Assistant Director
of Academic Development and Bar Programs at Touro Law Center. She has also
taught at Hofstra University School of Law and St. John’s University (Dept. of
Gov’t & Politics). Her practice experience includes her association with Willkie
Farr & Gallagher LLP (Employee Benefits/Executive Compensation) and Weil
Gotshal & Manges LLP (Tax). Professor Spiess represented corporate clients in
both public and private mergers, including cross-border acquisitions and
investments while regularly advising clients on employment, compensation,
employee benefit, pension, and insurance matters. Additionally, she served as
a court attorney for the N.Y.S. Supreme Court, Appellate Division (First
Department). Professor Spiess also has extensive training in mediating
commercial/employment disputes. Notably, she successfully mediated disputes
between Storm Sandy claimants and commercial insurers on behalf of New York
State Department of Financial Services and the United States District Court,
Eastern District.
Professor Spiess received her LL.M. (Taxation), New York University School
of Law; her J.D., magna cum laude, from Touro Law Center; and earned her
MA and BA, summa cum laude, (Government & Politics), at St. John's
University. Professor Spiess wishes to thank the editors of the John Marshall
Law Review for their invaluable assistance in bringing this article to
publication. She also wishes to thank her colleagues here at Touro Law Center,
Professors Dan Subotnik and Peter Zablotsky, and Irene Crisci, Interim
Director and Head of Public Service, Gould Law Library, for their insight,
candor and support in the preparation of this paper. Finally, this paper was first
presented at the Midwest Political Science Conference, Chicago IL, on April 8,
2017 as part of the panel discussion, “Theories of Law and Jurisprudence Over
Time”.
1. See Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11
CONST. COMM. 115 (1994) (commenting on the theory as espoused by BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, FOUNDATIONS (1991)).
1
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change occurring in the United States is a reflection of the
anticipated development of the social contract between the
government and its people. These changes ultimately start at a
more fundamental level – with the individual - and then coalesce on
the broader societal plane. But, because each individual has a
totally unique view of any given set of facts or situation at a
particular moment in time, to say that founding moments are
triggered by intense constitutional participation and deliberation by
the “People” would assume pure singularity of purpose by the same
“People” which is probably, at best, elusive and unattainable.
The power for constitutional change is imbued in the document
itself. It is broadly written so as to foster and support those
anticipated societal changes that must ultimately evolve in time.
The language of the document does not become irrelevant. Judicial
decisions and legislative acts are the touchstones of this societal
evolution. For example, the period between the 1930s and 1960s,
culminating in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, clearly demonstrates
the easing, although not the elimination, of racial intolerance and
inequality here in the United States. 2 This was not a founding
moment - but, rather, the expected pragmatic result to an existing
untenable legal and social position, with Brown v. Board of
Education as a mere part of that evolution.3 Further, some theorists
postulate that constitutional shifts are not linked to any one
moment, that such shifts are merely part of a “conversation”
between the government and its people.4 Although attractive, this
is not a wholly satisfying position as any conversation, however
brief and fleeting, must have some initial basis for coming into
existence – even if it is violent in nature and purpose. Thus, it
follows that violence perpetrated by certain members of society is
precipitated by the inevitable need for identity arising out of the
social contract itself. However, total success of any group over time
is deceptive due to the fractured nature of any “cohesive” position
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (enacted July 2,
1964, as amended).
3. Brown v. Board of Edu., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. See Simone Chambers, Contract or Conversation, Theoretical Lessons
from the Canadian Constitutional Crisis, 26 POLITICS AND SOCIETY 143 (1998);
see, e.g., Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the
“Living Constitution”, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456 (2001) (claiming that women
suffragists were important innovators of modern constitutional thought); Tracy
E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657 (1997)
(discussing the contribution of feminist legal theory to constitutional
interpretation); see also Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American
Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 1 (1999) (survey of judicial decisions integrating
specific and explicit use of social contract theory). But see Jaren Wilkerson,
Disappearing Together? American Federalism and Social Contract Theory, 17
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 569 (2014) (advocating for social change on the local rather
the federal level in order to protect the principles of American federalism and
social contact).
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held by a group of individuals who each think and process in a
singular way. As one theorist stated, “Governments may fall,
societies will persist…A new Caesar will cross the Rubicon, Italy
will remain.”5
To say that these are founding moments or extraConstitutional events, undercuts accountability and relevance for
those members of society who may see themselves as outside the
fray resulting in disenfranchisement and disconnection. Thus – the
legitimacy
crises
and
power struggles here in the United States are really just part of
“business as usual” and are to be expected and, in most cases,
probably desired.

A. Social Contract Theory and the American
Constitution: Hobbes and Locke
Social contract theory can be defined as one which “grounds the
legitimacy of political authority and the obligations of rulers and
subjects on a premised contract or contracts relating to these
matters.”6 It is without argument that the compelling philosophical
perspective of both Thomas Hobbes and John Locke regarding this
social contract between the government and the governed held
substantial sway over the drafters of the United States
Constitution. Specifically, “We the People” give up our natural
liberty and “put on the bonds of civil society…to join and unite into
a community for [the] comfortable, safe and peaceable living
amongst another in a secure enjoyment of [our] properties, and a
greater security against any that are not of it.”7
In Hobbes’ seminal work, The Leviathan, written during
England’s civil war as a commentary for peace in which the passions
of the individual are subordinated to civil authority which, in turn,
provides for the greater good, he writes:
A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men
do Agree and Covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatsoever
Men, or Assembly of Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right
to Present the Person of them all, that is to say, to be their
Representative); every one as well as be that Voted for it, as he that
Voted against it, shall Authorize all the Actions and Judgments of
5. ROBERT ARDREY, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, A PERSONAL INQUIRY INTO THE
EVOLUTIONARY SOURCES OF ORDER AND DISORDER 294 (1970).
6. See MICHAEL LESSNOFF, SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 3 (Michael Lessnoff,
ed., New York University Press 1990) (noting that political theorist John Rawls
has revived social contract theory to include the non-traditional approach of
incorporating social justice); ARDREY, supra note 5, at 294.
7. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY
97 (Michael Lessnoff, ed., New York University Press 1990).
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that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were
his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be
protected against other men.8

For Hobbes, even the dissenters – who voluntarily entered into
the Common-wealth with the rest - have tacitly agreed to be bound
and stand together with the majority.9 Anything short of such
agreement cuts against the core understanding that initially
brought the Common-wealth into existence. Specifically, Hobbes
states,
“what
the
major
part
ordayne:
and if refuse to stand thereto, or make Protestation against any of
their Decrees, he does contrary to his Covenant, and therefore
unjustly.”10
Hobbes, however, notably observes that at those times in a
Common-wealth when a false doctrine has been “negligently” or
“unskillfully” decreed by those “Governours” and “Teachers”, such a
doctrine generally received and found to be offensive, and “for those
men remissely governed, that they dare take up Armes, to defend
or introduce an Opinion…[i]t belongeth to him that hath the
Sovereign Power, to be Judge, or constitute all Judges of Opinions
and Doctrines, as a thing necessary for Peace; thereby to prevent
Discord and Civill Warre.” 11
John Locke, in his Second Treatise of Government, continues
the Hobbesian theme and explains the deliberate undertaking by
individuals to come together as one unified whole, subject to the
transcendent governmental authority. Locke states:
Wherever, therefore, any number of men are so united into one
society, as to quit every one of his executive power of the law of
nature, and to resign it to the public, there, and only there is a
political, or civil society. And this is done wherever any number of
men in the state of nature, enter into society to make one people, one
body politic, under one supreme government, or else any one joins
himself to, and incorporates with, any government already made.12

For Locke, the driving force for leaving the state of nature
where the individual is his absolute monarch and entering into a
community is for the “mutual preservation of their lives, liberties

8. Id.; THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 90 (Promethus Books 1988) (1651);
see also RICHARD ASHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS & LOCKE’S TWO
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 570-71 (1986) (opining that Hobbesian concepts of
“social contract” and the “state of nature” were associated with particular
socioeconomic groups and were successful weapons to be employed against
radicalism in the latter half of the seventeen century).
9. HOBBES, supra note 8, at 89.
10. Id. at 92.
11. Id. at 93.
12. Locke, supra note 7, at 96.

2017]

Constitutionalism and the Inevitability of the Social Contract

5

and estates” which Locke calls “property.” 13
Locke notes that consent makes one a member of any
commonwealth. Like Hobbes, tacit consent or agreement is possible
if the individual possesses property or reaps the benefit of any
government and in exchange for the obligation to obey the law.14
Locke also provides that in the commonwealth when
controversies arise and redress is to be made, such authority to
decide such controversies will vest in a judge – either in the form of
the legislature or in magistrates appointed by it.15 But – when the
controversy exists between the government and the people, Lock
provides:
[when the] law is silent or doubtful, or of great consequence, …the
proper umpire in such a case should be the body of the people, for in
cases where the [government] hath a trust reposed in [it] and is
dispensed from the common ordinary rules of the law; there, if any
men find themselves aggrieved, and think the [government] acts
contrary to or beyond that trust, who so proper to just as the body of
the people, who first lodged that trust in [it]….16

The language of the Preamble of the United States
Constitution reflects the Lockean notion of social contract - - that it
is the People that move from the state of nature and seek the
protection of the community (or Hobbes’s commonwealth) in pursuit
of order and law that leads to justice and happiness17 for present
and future generations.18
The Preamble states:
We the People, of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.19

As Justice Wilson, in Chisholm v. Georgia, stated, “With the
strictest propriety, therefore, classical and political, our national
scene opens with the most magnificent object which the nation could
present. ‘The PEOPLE of the United States’ are the first personages

13. Id. at 101.
14. Id. at 99. “[E]very man that hath any possessions, or enjoyment of any
part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent,
and is a far forth obliged to obedience to the law of that government during such
enjoyment as any one under it . . . ” Id.
15. Id. at 96.
16. Id. at 107.
17. See id. at 101 (illustrating for Locke that would be the preservation of
“property”).
18. See JOSHUA B. STEIN, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION FROM PLATO
TO ROUSSEAU 236 (2011).
19. U.S. CONST., pmbl.
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introduced.”20
In addition, of particular note, is the use of word “ordain.”21 The
deliberate use of this word by the drafters seems to suggest that the
People of the United States decree as their destiny their exit from
the state of nature (and their divestiture from the unsatisfactory
Articles of Confederation) to create a new contract with the
government until such time that the government acts contrary to
the People’s trust. It is then that the People may rightfully dissolve
the
very
government
which
they
established.22

B. Consent, Consensus and Legitimacy: The People
Social contract theory posits that individuals, i.e., the People,
enter into a community, either by express consent or tacit
agreement, in exchange for the protections and security offered by
same so that the individuals within that community can achieve
happiness and peacefulness.
Locke was clear that such participation in society is an
affirmative choice: “Nothing can make any man so, but his actually
entering into [society] by positive engagement, and express promise
and compact. This is that which I think concerning the beginning of
political societies, and their consent which makes a member of any
commonwealth.”23
But – what are the implications of express consent or tacit
agreement; specifically, as a collective unit – to what have the
governed consented?
As Justice Wilson, in Chisholm, stated, “[I]n my judgment, the
basis of sound and genuine jurisprudence; laws derived from the
pure source of equality and justice must be founded on the
CONSENT of those whose obedience they require. The sovereign,
when traced to his source, must be found in the man.” 24
20. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.419, 463 (1793).
21. Id.; see Dan Himmelfarb, The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation,
2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 127, 132 (1991-92); see also Craig M. Lawson, The
Literary Force of the Preamble, 39 MERCER L. REV. 879 (1987-88) (describing
the dynamic tension arising from the artful placement of phrasing); see also
Robert J. Peaslee, Our National Constitution: The Preamble, 9 B.U. L. REV. 2,
18 (1929) (discussing historical underpinnings of the Preamble and
responsibility of individuals under the Constitution, “Divided though
responsibility is among myriads of individuals, no one’s share is greater or less
than that of any other. To each an equal portion is given. Accept it then not only
willingly, but proudly.”).
22. Locke, supra note 7, at 105-06. Theoretically, the federal government
and its social contract with the governed could be dissolved by constitutional
amendment; U.S. CONST. art. V.
23. Locke, supra note 7, at 100; see also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, THAT AMERICANS COMBAT INDIVIDUALISM BY FREE
INSTITUTIONS 194 (Richard D. Heffner, ed., Penguin Putnam Inc. 1984).
24. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 458. (emphasis in the original); see also West
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If the pure source of equality and justice is founded on the
consent of those whose obedience they require, there is a
pronounced difficulty in determining what is consensus and the
difficulty of achieving same. Specifically, individual realities as to
what is desired or needed are as varied as the individuals
themselves. So – how is the social contract established and, then
amended, if the needs and wants of the governed change? When is
change desired? How is that desire measured? How is that desire
legitimized?
Modern consensus building theory and practice may be
instructive in serving as a paradigm for measuring social contract
legitimacy under our Constitution. The major premises for
examination include:
•

•

•

•

Interdependence among the stakeholders is critical;
individual success is diminished when compared to
collaborative success and, thus, serves as an incentive for
collaboration and cooperation among group members. If
satisfaction of individual interests can be attained
without the group, then individual interests will prevail.
Participants must constructively deal with their
differences; differences in values, needs, and interests
must be recognized, worked with and respected. “Goodfaith" participation by stakeholders is required because
destructive attempts to undermine a party's differing
interests will likely cause the process to break down.
Decisions must be jointly owned by the group.
Participants in the consensus-building process must
agree on the final decisions and be willing to implement
those decisions themselves.
Consensus building or collaboration is a process; to be
successful, the group must be allowed time and flexibility
to solve a problem. If the collaborative process is
successful, new solutions emerge that no single party
could have envisioned or implemented on their own. 25

Virginia State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S 624, 641 (1943).
There is no mysticism in the American concept of the State or of the
nature or origin of its authority. We set up government by consent of the
governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in power any legal
opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here is to be controlled by
public opinion, not public opinion by authority.
West Virginia State Bd. Of Educ., 319 U.S. at 641.
25. BARBARA GRAY, COLLABORATING: FINDING COMMON GROUND FOR
MULTIPARTY PROBLEMS 11-16 (1989); see also ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, SOCIAL
CHANGE AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 30 (1979)(stating, “[T]he group enables the
individual to enjoy a higher degree of freedom and liberty…through collective
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As Jeffrey Reiman observes in his essay, “The Constitution, Rights
and the Conditions of Legitimacy”:
[Stakeholders] are shaped by existing moral beliefs and therefore
may agree to arrangements which in fact do subjugate them. What
remains then is to look for nonsubjugating governance by asking
what it would be rational for people to agree with…. The social
contract is a way of determining what form of government is
nonsubjugating among people who have (or may have) differing
moral visions.26

Notably, two differing moral visions clashed head-on in Brown
v. Board of Education.27 The case is often cited as an instance where
the Supreme Court essentially overreached to arrive at its
landmark decision: student access to state-provided educational
facilities is not to be denied based on race – that the doctrine of
“separate but equal” was unconstitutional and that the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment supported such a reading.
Strict constructionists and extra-constitutional theorists, although
supportive of the outcome, take the position that legitimacy of the
decision (and others like it) may be suspect as the text of the
Constitution does not support such a reading and that a proper
remedy should have been found by other constitutional means, i.e.,
amendment or legislation.28

union, persons may accomplish ends which they would be unable to achieve as
individuals, and they may join in opposing the coercive tactics of other stronger
individuals and associations.”).
26. Jeffrey Reiman, The Constitution, Rights and the Conditions of
Legitimacy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 141 (Alan
S. Rosenbaum, ed., 1998); see also Pamela A. Mason, Rhetorics of ‘the People’,
the Social Contract, and the Constitution, 61 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS 275
(1999) (an interpretative study of United States v. Verdago-Urquidez, 484 U.S.
259 (1990), a Fourth Amendment case, “regarding the constitutional rhetoric of
‘the People’ and with exclusionary and inclusionary understandings of the
national community”).
27. Brown v. Board of Edu., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28. See, e.g., John Valery White, Brown v. Board of Education and the
Origins of the Activist Insecurity in Civil Rights Law, 28 OHIO N.U.L.R. 303
(2002) (a discussion of the Brown decision and the judiciary’s “activist
insecurity” causing it to fail in its task of producing social change.); see Hon.
Charles B. Blackmar, Judicial Activism, 42 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 753 (1997-98)
(discussion of the meaning and significance of activism in courts of last resort);
see Michael J.Perry, Judicial Activism, 7 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 69 (1984)
(discussion of legitimacy and enforcement of contraconstitutional and
extraconstitutinal judicial review); see Hon. William Wayne Justice, The Two
Faces of Judicial Activism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1992-93) (describing
judicial activism as manifesting in two different forms: jurisprudential activism
and remedial activism). But see Luther M. Swygert, In Defense of Judicial
Activism, 16 VAL. U. L. REV. 439 (1981-82) (responding to the criticism that
courts are undemocratic and inconsistent with our form of government); see
Hon. Frank M. Johnson, Jr. In Defense of Judicial Activism, 28 EMORY L. J. 901
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Not surprisingly, southern political leaders were outraged with
the Brown decision and viewed it as an unconstitutional
infringement on the rights of the States and of those governed. On
March 12, 1956, in the “Declaration of Constitutional Principles,”
introduced on the floor of the Senate by Walter F. George, D-Ga.,
the Brown decision was characterized as one “where men substitute
naked power for established law.”29 Members of Congress warned
against the “trend in the federal judiciary undertaking to legislate,
in derogation of the authority of Congress, and to encroach upon the
reserved rights of the States and the people.”30
However, attacking constitutional decisions on legitimacy
grounds has the dangerous potential to disenfranchise segments of
society.31 Disenfranchisement could include a large cohort of
stakeholders who have agreed to state protection of certain moral
values that encompassing commensurate basic rights, and such
disenfranchisement could effectively undercut the efficacy and
stability of the state.32 Expounding on Reiman, social contract can
be the protection against such attacks.33
For example, in West Virginia State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette,
which preceded Brown by eleven years, the Supreme Court finding
that the West Virginia State Board of Education, as a state actor,
was subject to the requirements of the 14th Amendment, stated that
“The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects
the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures -- Boards
of Education not excepted.”34 In the Barnette decision, the majority
determined, ultimately on First Amendment grounds, that a school
board could not expel high school students for no other reason but
for refusing to say the “Pledge of Allegiance” due to religious
beliefs.35 Thus, the inference here is that although a state is not

(1979) (examining the legacy of the Warren court and concluding that judicial
activism in defense of constitutional liberty is no threat).
29. 102 CONG. REC. 4459-4460 (March 12, 1956). Nineteen senators and
seventy-seven members of the House supported this declaration. Id.
30. Id.
31. See JAMES J. KIRKPATRICK, THE SOUTHERN CASE FOR SCHOOL
SEGREGATION 188 (1962) (“I believe the South will maintain what I have termed
essential separation of the races for years to come.”).
32. See Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); see also
David A.J. Richards, Revolution and Constitutionalism in America, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE AND LEGITIMACY 104 (Michel
Rosenfeld, ed., Duke University Press 1994) (discussing the American
revolutionary principle of natural rights as the impetus for the Reconstruction
Amendments).
33. Reiman, supra note 26, at 141.
34. West Virginia State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943);
see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (citing Barnette, court holding high
school students have a property interest in public education and cannot be
expelled without due process as guaranteed under the 14th Amendment).
35. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
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obligated to provide public education, once a state does so, it cannot
infringe on such a right by denying a student access to education
without due process subject to First Amendment guarantees.36
In reading Brown, along with Barnette, the right to a
desegregated education as a property right can be found.
Specifically, the Brown Court compares the value of receiving a
desegregated education with a segregated education and concludes
that there are measurable benefits in receiving an education in a
desegregated school.37 Traditionally, only property can be measured
or valued and once valued, then compared to other like property.
Therefore, it follows that if the Court has determined that the value
of a desegregated education outweighs a segregated education and
since property can be valued and compared, then there is a strong
argument that the right to a desegregated education is a property
right and cannot be denied without due process of law.
By viewing desegregated education as a property right, then
the Constitutional social contract which preserves individuals’
“lives, liberties and estates,” collectively “property,”38 is inviolable
and the limits of government must be held in check.
Further, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court
examined a Connecticut statute which made it a criminal offence
for anyone to provide counseling or assistance to another in regard
to the use of contraceptives. 39The Supreme Court, in a 7 to 2
decision, held that the state has no right to invade the privacy of the
marital relationship, along with the physician’s role in that
relationship, as this relationship is the oldest and most sacred of
associations.40 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, refers to
this right of privacy as a penumbra emanating from the Bill of
Rights that help give constitutional guarantees “life and
substance.”41
Of particular note, however, is Justice Goldberg’s concurring
opinion where he traces the right to privacy directly to the Ninth
Amendment which states:, “The enumeration in the Constitution of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people.”42 Justice Goldberg explores the history of
the Ninth Amendment citing Madison’s fear that any bill of rights
36. Id.
37. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
38. Locke, supra note 7, at 101.
39. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Appellant Griswold was
the Executive Director of Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and
Appellant Baxton was a physician and professor at Yale Medical College and
Director of the League. They were both arrested, convicted and fined for
providing medical advice and information to married persons regarding
contraception devices and materials. Id.
40. Id. at 493.
41. Id. at 484.
42. U.S CONST. amend. IX.
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was not sufficiently broad to cover all essential rights and that such
enumerated rights would be interpreted as a denial of others not so
enumerated.43 He goes on to say that, “In determining which rights
are fundamental, judges are not left at large to decide cases in light
of their personal and private notions. Rather, they must look to the
‘traditions and [collective] conscience of our people’ to determine
whether a principle is ‘so rooted [there] . . . as to be ranked as
44
fundamental.’”
For Locke, the Constitution’s silence on the guarantee of equal
protection as it applies to education as established in Brown or one’s
right to privacy found in Griswold, finds firm ground on the notion
that the trust of the People is not being compromised by charges of
illegitimacy when the judiciary acts to preserves those rights.45 By
entering into a body politic, Locke maintained those individuals’
rights do not diminish – otherwise there would be no basis for
forming a state. 46 In modern parlance, collaboration among
stakeholders leads to a net gain – more can be achieved as a group,
than by acting as an individual.47 Further, although stakeholders,
acting in good faith, must recognize differences among the group’s
interests, needs, and values in order to achieve consensus in
successfully solving a problem, [a majority of] rational people would
agree that basic rights would include a right to privacy in one’s
bedroom and a right to public education, and the state, through its
judicial decisions, must protect these rights as part of the social
contract between it and the People.
Clearly, early support for upholding the American social
contract through judicial actions can be found in Alexander
Hamilton’s Federalist 78:
A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a
fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its
meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding
from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an
irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior
obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other
words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the
intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the
judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of
the people is superior to both; and that where the will of the
legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the

43. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 490.
44. Id. at 493. (further citations omitted); see also DAVID A.J. RICHARDS,
TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 256-61 (1986) (discussing American
jurisprudence and “constitutional” privacy).
45. See Locke, supra note 7, at 102.
46. Id. at 97.
47. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 30.
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people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed
by the latter rather than the former. They ought to regulate their
decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are
not fundamental.48

But – what are the intentions of the People? Locke understood
that unanimity in society was rarely achievable and, therefore:
By the consent of every individual, made a Community one Body,
with a Power to Act as one Body, which is only by the will and
determination of the majority…it is necessary the Body should move
that way whither the greater force that carries it, which is the
consent of the majority.49

Collaborative decision-making and consensus building
requires that differences in values, interests and needs must be
recognized or the process breaks down. Locke recognized this and
cautioned “For where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there
cannot act as one Body and consequently will be immediately
dissolved….”50
Here, again, Reiman is instructive as he posits that “A
constitution that limits government in ways that ensure sufficient
protection
of
everyone’s
rights
keeps
the
moral
promise…[G]overnment is legitimate to the extent that it protects
people’s basic rights sufficiently to defeat the suspicion that those
who dissent from governmental actions are subjugated by those
actions.”51
Perhaps it is precisely this point that caused the seismic shift
of the 2016 electorate against Hillary Clinton and the Democratic
Party and, thus, elevated Donald Trump to the Presidency.52 What
followed, however, is the visceral response as to the legitimacy of
Trump as President by the now seemingly disenfranchised minority
who believe that this President subjugates (or appears to subjugate)
48. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added).
49. Locke, supra note 7, at 96 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 97. As Justice Jackson noted in Barnette, “Those who begin
coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters.
Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the
graveyard.” West Virginia State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641
(1943).
51. Reiman, supra note 26, at 137.
52. See, e.g., 7 Reasons on How Donald Trump Won the Presidential Election,
NPR (Nov. 12, 2016), www.npr.org/2016/11/12/501848636/7-reasons-donaldtrump-won-the-presidential-election; How Did Donald Trump Win?, CNN (Nov.
10, 2016), www.cnn.com/2016/11/10/politics/why-donald-trump-won/; Why Did
Donald Trump Win? Just Visit Luzerne County, PA, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 16, 2016),
www.newsweek.com/2016/12/16/donald-trump-pennsylvania-win-luzernecounty-527861.html; The Real Reason Why Donald Trump Won: Trend Away
from Incumbents, NATIONAL REVIEW (Jan. 17, 2017), www.nationalreview.com/
2017/01/real-reason-trump-won-trend-away-incumbents-strongest-factor/; How
Trump Won, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Jan. 20, 2017), www.realclearpolitics.com/a
rticles/2017/01/20/how_trump_won_--_conclusions_132846.html.
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the basic rights of the dissenters to the actions of the government53
– the very government that is entrusted with the protection of these
rights.
As a cautionary tale, Joshua Stein, in his Commentary on the
Constitution, uses the resignation of Richard Nixon as an example
of government violating the spirit of the social contract – where no
person is above the agreed upon law.54 Stein cites Locke who wrote,
“whoever has the Legislative or Supreme Power of any
Commonwealth is bound to govern by established standing laws,
promulgated and known to the People, and not by Extemporary
Decrees.” 55 Although noting that America did not replicate
England’s Glorious Revolution of 1688 that ousted James II, Stein
remarks that Locke would probably have cheered Nixon’s
resignation in August 1974 as he had placed himself above the
common compact [moral promise] which is the Constitution of the
United States.56
Further, the Constitution as moral promise remains static
while who comprises the majority and minority shifts. For example,
when the Thirteenth Amendment was introduced to the House of
Representatives on March 19, 1864 by Representative James
Wilson, he commented on the dramatic change in public opinion on
the slavery issue as a result of the Civil War, stating, “[a] public
opinion now existing in the country in opposition to this power is
the result of slavery overleaping itself, rather than of the
determination of freemen to form it.”57
Thus, what is once the majority becomes the minority and vicea versa, how does the State relate to such shifts and, consequently,
what is the effect on the social contract? According to Robert A.
Dahl, “A central guiding thread of American constitutional
development has been the evolution of a political system in which
all the active and legitimate groups in the population can make
themselves heard at some crucial stage in the process of decision.”58
53. Supra note 52; see Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27,
2017) (banning for 90 days, among other changes to immigration policies and
procedures, entry into the United States of individuals from seven countries);
see also Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (stating, “But freedom to differ is not limited
to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom.
The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart
of the existing order.”).
54. JOSHUA STEIN, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION – FROM PLATO TO
ROUSSEAU 246 (2011).
55. Locke, supra note 7, at 102.
56. STEIN, supra note 54, at 246.
57. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong. 1st Sess. 1199-1206 (1864) (Rep. Wilson)
(further citations omitted); see also Locke, supra note 7, at 89. Locke states that
“For a man not having the power of his own life cannot by compact, or his
consent, enslave himself to anyone, nor put himself under the absolute,
arbitrary power of another to take his life when he pleases.” Id.
58. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 137 (1956)
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Constitutional theorist, Arthur Selwyn Miller, who agrees with
Dahl, opined that it was only those policies that strike a balance
between pleasing the most people and offending the least number
are eventually formed and established here in the United States.59
Miller continues, “Put in another way, this means that the State is
not all-powerful; it cannot operate as it wishes, it cannot fail to take
into serious consideration the demands or wishes of units of our
organizational society.”60
Miller points out that there is a crisis in American
constitutionalism which centers on the “problem of getting true
national-interest decisions in a system in which decisions are the
result of the interaction of the group interests and tend to reflect
the lowest common denominator among affected groups.”61
Therefore, it follows that within each of these units or groups
there can only be a fractured unity of the group’s demands or wishes
as each member’s take on any particular issue is always skewed by
that member’s own unique view as to the reality of the particular
problem and the forthcoming solution. Although the consensus of
the group emerges out of a process among stakeholders – the body
politic – the coming together to exchange individual rights for the
protections offered by the state, the potential for violence simmers
below the surface. This stasis among members arguably maintains
the status quo within the group (and among other groups), but
should the State fail the People in its performance under the social
contract by creating policies that seem to cater to one group at the
expense of another (which ultimately trickles down and
disenfranchises the individual), a reaction, even a violent one, is to
be expected, along with any constitutional shift. For as John Ardrey
in The Social Contract explains a minority [sub-group] never sheds
the need to be recognized: “The violent sub-group, whatever its just
demands or righteous protestations, seeks as a primary satisfaction
the innate need for identity.”62
For example, Roe v. Wade, decided in 1973 by a 7-2 majority,
relying on Griswold, expanded the constitutionally protected right
to privacy to include a woman’s right to have an abortion, but such
a right is qualified and the state could regulate the procedure in
order to protect a woman’s health.63 The Court stated, “We,
(further citations omitted).
59. ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, SOCIAL CHANGE AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 70
(1979).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 91.
62. ARDREY, supra note 5, at 294.
63. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992):

[T]hese matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
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therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the
abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified, and must
be considered against important state interests in regulation.”64
The Roe case, although decided almost forty-five years ago, still
ignites a firestorm of controversy, occasionally marked by extreme
violence. At the time the decision was rendered, the Nation, in an
editorial noted:
As nearly as ten years ago, it was inconceivable that such a decision
could have been handed down. What are the prerequisites for such a
reversal of attitude at the highest judicial level? For one thing, there
must be a special constituency, imbued with zeal, packing the force of
reason, and pushing hard for a change in the law. Without an active
vanguard, the ancient concepts will not be questioned, much less
critically examined.65

However, commenting on the Roe decision and the abortion
controversy that still rages, Lawrence Tribe noted that the debate
has become a “clash of absolutes” between Roe’s defenders and
detractors with little room for compromise.66 That said, for now the
decision still stands, but – if it is eventually overturned, then it
follows that those disenfranchised by such a decision would
ultimately exercise those rights guaranteed through the social
contract to bring about change through some other political or
governmental means.
Disenfranchisement of those who constitute the fractured
parts of the whole, and the destructive inertia that could result, was
foreseen by James Madison as he developed his theory of
factionalism.67 Notably, Madison, in writing to Thomas Jefferson in
1788, warned against such a threat:
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger
of oppression. In our Governments, the real power lies in the
majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is
chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to
the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government

and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833 at 851; see also Brown v. Board of Edu., 347
U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
64. Roe, U.S. 410 at 154.
65. Roe v. Wade, THE NATION (Feb. 5, 1973), www.thenation.com/article/roev-wade/ (further citations omitted) (emphasis added).
66. LAWRENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF THE ABSOLUTES (1982).
67. See infra notes 68, 75 (Madison’s “factionalism” defined).
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is the mere instrument of the major number of the Constituents.68

For Locke, oppression of rights (i.e., confiscation of property
[which includes lives, liberties and estates]) by the government or
by special interests within the government (or the failure of the
government to guard against such special interests) provides the
impetus for reclamation of such rights which could include the very
destruction of the government.69 Recognition of the tension between
the Lockean theory of social contract and majority rule with
Madison’s astute observations of the destructive effect of
factionalism within the Republic (which can result in a breach of
the social contract), finds its genesis in Madison’s critique of the
Articles of Confederation, Vices of the Political Systems of the United
States, written in May 1787. Madison asks when an “apparent
interest or common passion unites a majority, what is to restrain
them from unjust violations of the rights and interests of the
minority, or of individuals?”70 Madison, in answering this question
points to three motives: “prudent regard to [the majority]’s
own
good as involved in the general and permanent good of the
community”; “respect for character”; and, religion.71
Madison, next examines each motive in turn, and dismisses
each one as a proper restraint against the majority’s suppression of
the minority.72 Madison ultimately concludes since it is the primary
objective of the Government to be “sufficiently neutral between the
different interests and factions, to controul one part of the society
from invading the rights of another, and at the same time
sufficiently controuled itself, from setting up an interest adverse to
that of the whole Society.”73 Here, Madison is articulating the
nature of social contract and the clear duty of the Government to
mitigate the self-serving interests of groups by recognizing this duty
and to perform as the social contract [moral promise] demands.
Anything less is a breach of and a failure by the Government to
uphold the trust instilled in it by the People for which they gave up
their natural liberty.
Finally, Madison sees that it will only be through a large
68. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788) in THE
JAMES MADISON PAPERS AT THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Gaillard Hunt ed., New
York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1900-1910).
69. See Locke, supra note 7; see also ARDREY, supra note 5, at 296 (“The
immense industrial and agricultural complex which has banished or can banish
economic insecurity from our lives rests, a much as any other social institution,
on the web of interdependence. Without a high degree of order…it cannot
function.”).
70. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the U. States (May 7,
1787), in THE JAMES MADISON PAPERS AT THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Gaillard
Hunt ed., New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1900-1910).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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republic whereby the pool of candidates is exponentially increased
that “such a process of elections as will most certainly extract from
the mass of the society the purest and noblest characters which it
contains; such as will at once feel most strongly the proper motives
to pursue the end of their appointment, and be most capable to
devise the proper means of attaining it.”74 It is the elected officials,
as representative of the People – the body politic- reflecting these
constituencies [and the range of opinions and issues] from whence
they come, that are the agents for keeping the moral promise as
imbued in the Constitution.
Madison was clearly fearful of the destructive nature of
factions in a purely democratic system and understood the oft selfserving nature of human beings. 75 In his famous Federalist 10, he
campaigned for a republican form of government as a means of
tempering such tendencies and guaranteeing the moral promise. 76
He wrote:
A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning
government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of
practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending
for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions
whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have,
in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual
animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and
oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good... [t]he
regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the
principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party
and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the
government.77

Here, Madison understood the value of consensus building
among stakeholders which is critical to the success of any
undertaking and inextricably linked to the Lockean principles of
social contract. He recognized that Government is charged with
mediating those positions that will often be at odds with each other;
however, successful resolution of any problem mandates that these
competing interests must be taken into consideration without the
subversive undercutting of a differing party’s position and by
74. Id.
75. Id. Madison defined “factions” as “a number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated
by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” Id.; see
also TOCQUEVELLE, supra note 23, at 121; see also MORTON WHITE, PHILOSPHY,
THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 77-78 (1989) (discussing Madison’s
view of factionalism as being caused by the various and unequal distributions
of property).
76. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
77. Id. (emphasis added).
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rewarding collaboration over individual gain. Short of this - the
process will break down, perhaps irretrievably and any “resolution”
emanating from such a flawed process, will be suspect, but such
suspicion and reaction thereto will not be unexpected.
As previously noted, Locke wrote that if the People “find
themselves aggrieved, and think the [government] acts contrary to
or beyond that trust, who so proper to just as the body of the people,
who first lodged that trust in [it].”78 Given the present national
milieu, the sensitivity to the Constitution as moral promise is
heightened. As in our past, today’s judicial scrutiny of executive and
legislative decisions is commensurate with the evolving social
contract between the People and the Government along with the
ongoing consent of the governed to submit to the protections of the
Government. However, as Justice Wilson wrote in Chisholm v.
Georgia, implicating Lockean social contract, “As a citizen, I know
the government of that state to be republican; and my short
definition of such a government is one constructed on this principle
79
-- that the supreme power resides in the body of the people.”
Although the “body of the people” conjures up a vision of a
whole with many parts each clamoring for recognition, identity, and
validation, Reiman’s observations are helpful:
[O]ur disagreements over the Constitution are shaped by and
contained within thee moral vocabulary of the Constitution and are
thus those things on which we have agreed to disagree…The
Constitution projects a moral culture, and this itself, even if it
doesn’t constrain us to one single outcome, constrains us
nevertheless and does the work of limiting government power – even
the Supreme Court’s power as it reinterprets the Constitution80

It is precisely this moral culture – founded on the principles of
preserving life, liberty and property through our social contract –
although constrains us, sustains us as well.

78. See Locke, supra note 7, at 107.
79. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 457 (1793).
80. Reiman, supra note 26, at 146-47.
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